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ABSTRACT 
The gap between law’s pronouncement of rules and their impact or failure in concrete social environments has long 
prompted efforts to make lawyers more responsive to the “realities on the ground”. While this turn to sociological 
jurisprudence seemed a logical consequence of the Legal Realists’ attack on formalism and positivism, it exposed 
legal theory to a never-ending series of questions concerning the limits of law in becoming an empirically informed 
social science. Even trailblazing Legal Realists themselves questioned the extent to which empirical knowledge 
might erode the core of law’s claim to authority. Where are we today, after numerous transgressions à la “law & 
economics”, “law & society”, “law & psychology” etc? But, how should this question be answered in light of the 
globalization of social relations, that has brought about the rise of numerous, border-crossing regulatory regimes, 
comprised of national/international, hard/soft, official/in-official ‘legal’ norms? Do these developments merely 
suggest a reprise of last century’s sociological turn?  
In this article, I want to suggest that there is a significant difference between the current interest of law in sociology 
(anthropology, geography) and the earlier instance of legal sociology. Whereas historically earlier stances 
responded, in no small degree, to legal positivism and, eventually, to both technological and societal change, the 
current social scientific engagement by lawyers appears driven by a differently articulated concern, even anxiety, 
about the viability of legal analytical, conceptual and semantic tools in a changed, transnational context. With the 
shift of law’s bearings from the nation-state to globalization’s strange land, law’s need to learn anew and differently 
can be felt throughout: in textbooks, classrooms, professional ethics and legal practice. In light of the again 
growing importance of interdisciplinarity, legal pluralism and globalization, law’s new frontier might lie in its 
reconstitution as transnational sociological jurisprudence. At the center of such an enterprise lies an engagement 
with the ways in which legal “fields” are conceptualized and put into practice as determinative translations  
between competing sets of knowledge. The here made contention is that underneath the shifts between different 
disciplinary approaches to law in the context of legal sociology, comparative law, post-colonial studies or different 
iterations of “law and…” (culture, history, anthropology, geography etc) are longstanding questions regarding law 
as doctrine, theory, practice, culture. These are re-emerging with particular thrust in the transnational regulatory 
realm, that is to markedly characterized by the absence of institutional infrastructures known from the Western rule 
of law and welfare state traditions.
♦ This article is based on a presentation at the IJGLS Conference on “Regulatory Translations”, Istanbul, 16-18 May
2013. The author is grateful to Umut Turem, Andrea Ballestero and Fred Aman for organizing an inspiring 
interdisciplinary conference and to Jothie Rajah, Anna-Katharina Kaufmann and Philip Liste for very helpful 
comments and feedback. An earlier, shorter version is included in the edited collection “Law in Transition: Rights, 
Development and Transitional Justice (R.Buchanan & P.Zumbansen, eds., Hart Publishing, 2013) under the title 
“Sociological Jurisprudence 2.0”. 
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of Law and Canada Research Chair, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. Senior Research Scholar, Michigan Law 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, handed down in June 2013, have been 
attracting considerable attention – most presumably because of their “bigger picture” 
significance in the context of public political debate in the area of equal protection. The Court’s 
pronouncement in United States v Windsor1 was concerned at its center with the contested 
constitutionality of the federal DEFENCE OF MARRIAGE ACT [DOMA] of 19962, according to 
which marriage was defined as a “bond between one man and one woman”.3 The Court struck 
down sec. 3 of the Act, holding it to be a violation of the equal protection clause under the 5th 
amendment. Decided the same day, in Hollingsworth v Perry, the Court ruled that a petitioner 
group that defended the constitutionality of a California constitutional amendment rendering 
same-sex marriages illegal had no standing, where the government had opted not to stand trial to 
defend this amendment (the so-called Proposition 8).4 These two decisions stand squarely within 
a much belabored context of legal, political and cultural battles over equal protection and privacy 
rights.5 Yet, if we wanted to clearly demarcate different legal fields touched upon by these cases, 
we would very soon find ourselves enumerating one regulatory regime after another. As the 
author of the opinion in Windsor, Justice Kennedy, noted, the enactment of DOMA put into 
place a statute that would directly and indirectly have an impact on “over 1,000 federal statutes”, 
with the consequence that the decision, on its face concerned with a particular legal definition 
operated in fact in many different legal arenas simultaneously, ranging from constitutional to 
social insurance law, from housing to trusts and estates, from tax law to family and adoption law 
as well as landlord and tenant law. At the same time, all of these fields would be mobilized in a 
context, which gives rise to intriguing questions of procedural law and federalism. 
It would seem, then, that both decisions are ‘local’ in that they arise out of a particularly U.S. 
American regulatory and adjudicatory context and can be read, understood and appreciated 
against this very background. And yet, taking just one step ‘aside’, we can see how the issues at 
work in Windsor as well as in Perry are by no means exclusively proprietary to the American 
constitutional discourse. Instead, we can easily discern a number of comparative connections to 
similarly situated legal disputes in foreign jurisdictions where the question of same sex marriage 
has long become a hot topic of legal and public deliberation. As becomes clear already in 
Windsor from the fact that the plaintiff, Edith Schlain Windsor, and her late partner, Thea Clara 
Spyer, had entered a relationship in the 1960s and then been married under newly enacted law in 
Ontario, Canada in 2007, they had “shopped” for a legal regime that would accommodate their 
aspiration for formal legal recognition of their relationship before such norms would become 
1 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S.____ (2013), arg. 27 March, dec. 26 June 2013. 
2 Pub.L. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419, enacted September 21, 1996, 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C 
3 Defence of Marriage Act, Sec. 3 
4 Hollingsworth et. v. Perry et al., 570 U.S.____ (2013), arg. 26 March 2013, dec. 26 June 2013. 
5 See Romer v Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
available in the U.S.6 The case arose out of the tax levied onto Ms Windsor to whom Ms Spyer 
had bequeathed her entire estate, a tax that the IRS had justified with reference to DOMA, 
despite the fact that the state of New York had formally recognized the legality of the marriage 
concluded under Canadian law, when Windsor and Spyer returned to their residency in New 
York – two years before Ms Spyer deceased in 2009. A growing number of other countries, then, 
including Canada of course, has seen comparable developments in the granting, expansion or 
limitation of equal protection guarantees in the area of same sex relationships.7 
This observation would place the otherwise “American” set of cases that we just referred to in a 
context of so-called comparative constitutional law, an area of legal research with a considerably 
young and yet already significant pedigree8, both as regards its impressive theoretical progress9 
as well as its practical-political importance in the context of transnational judicial dialogue.10 
Seen through the lens of comparative law, we are able to study a ‘local’ jurisprudential event 
such as the U.S. Supreme Courts’ decisions of June 2013 as illustrations of a change in legal 
(political, cultural) perception under way in other countries as well. Indeed, many areas often 
considered exclusively in a local, domestic context, reveal their transnational dimension11 once 
we begin to trace more carefully the trajectories and impacts of ‘migrating’ norms, principles and 
standards.12 But, once we direct our attention to such changes in the law across a growing range 
of jurisdictions, we can begin to discern the particular nature in which such changes grow out of 
debates and legal, jurisprudential developments that are local and transnational at the same 
time.13 
6 For more background on the concept of“shopping“ for law, see ERIN A. O’HARA AND LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE
LAW MARKET (2009); Horst Eidenmüller, The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, and 
Transnational Corporations, ms. 2010, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681982 (last visited 30 August 2013). 
7 See, e.g., Kelly Kollman, Same-Sex Unions: The Globalization of an Idea, 51 INT’L STUD. QUART. 329 (2007) ; 
more recent data may be retrieved at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-sex_union_legislation  
8 MAURO CAPPELLETTI/WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1979); DURGA DAS BASU,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1984); VICKI C. JACKSON/MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 2ND. ED. (2006); NORMAN DORSEN/MICHEL ROSENFELD/ANDRÁS SAJÓ/SUSANNE BAER, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM. CASES AND MATERIALS. 2ND ED. (2010), 36 ff 
9 Gérard V. La Forest, The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law Issues, 34 
CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (1996); Louise Arbour/Fannie Lafontaine, Beyond Self-
Congratulation: The Charter at 25 in an International Perspective, 45 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 239 (2007); 
Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional 
Interpretation, INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 819 (1999), 941: “A court’s choice of interpretive methodology will affect 
more than the outcome the particular case before it. It will also likely affect the broader constitutional culture of the 
interpreting court’s jurisdiction.” 
10 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1103 (2000); 
Alexandra Kemmerer, Constitutional Law as Work of Art – Experts’ Eyes: Judges of the World Examine the 
Constitution of Europe, 4 GERMAN L.J. 859 (2003). 
11 For more background, see Peer Zumbansen, Comparative, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism: The 
Emergence of a Transnational Constitutional Pluralist Order, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 16 (2012). 
12 Sujit Choudhry (ed.^eds.), THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (2006). 
13 This is the perspective taken by legal scholars and political scientists interested in the “spatial turn“: for an 
insightful illustration and engagement, see Philip Liste, Lost Without a Translation? Cross-Referencing and a New 
Global Community of Courts, 21 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. ____ (2014) [this issue] 
A “field“ area such as comparative constitutional law or, as authors have convincingly been 
arguing, constitutionalism14, appears inherently unstable, both as regards its substantive content 
and its analytical contours. Indeed, as we become witnesses of ever more proliferating ways and 
forms of legal “transplants” in hard and soft, formal and informal shapes15, it appears as if what 
we can here perceive resembles in many ways the types of a transnationalization of law, which in 
particular commercial lawyers have long been highlighting as a promising laboratory to study the 
modern evolution of legal norm generation and dissemination.16 Likewise, as in our present 
example, in areas where we are concerned with sensitive societal questions of regulatory 
intervention, we will increasingly find dynamics of ‘borrowing’, ‘mimicking’, ‘impregnation’ 
and other forms of travelling norms and principles, promulgated by courts’ in one country citing 
courts in other countries, by judges (and other officials) engaging in transnational dialogue17, or 
by a form of legal transplant that in itself merits very close attention. Complementing, sometimes 
trailing, but most frequently driving states’ action, private transnational actors can be seen to 
significantly engage in processes of norm development and generation. In the here used example 
of the Supreme Court’s same sex decisions, the importance of the just announced business policy 
on the part of Wal-Mart to extend its employee-directed health care benefits package to same sex 
partners is of particular interest.18 Considering the fact that the country’s single largest employer 
with about 1.3 million employees in the U.S. (with a total of 2.2 million worldwide19) adopts 
such a policy without a legal obligation to do so, points to the particular relations between 
“public” and “private” norm making processes. The sheer factual size of this regulatory program 
prompts a closer scrutiny as to the “legal” nature of such a set of self-imposed obligations. 
Closely related to such questions of how to demarcate the legal nature of the processes before the 
Supreme Court and the purported non-law character of Wal-Mart’s newly enacted policy are 
concerns with the character of the institutions involved in norm-generation as such. To some 
degree, such questions are still hypothetical, as a corporation such as Wal-Mart is not considered 
an entity granted with the authority to issue binding legal norms. And yet, the tight integration of 
“private” actors in various, wide-spread norm producing and implementing contexts in the area 
                                                          
14 See DORSEN ET AL., supra, note ___. 
15 For an insightful illustration, see Iza Hussein, How, and Why, Law Travels: Translations, Circulations, 
Transformations, 21 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD.____ (2014) [this issue] 
16 See, e.g., JH Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Commercial 
and Financial Legal Order and its Lex Mercatoria, 24 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (2006); 
Roy Goode, Usage and Its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law, 46 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
LAW QUARTERLY 1 (1997); Ross Cranston, Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law, 42 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL 597 (2007); Gralf-Peter Calliess/Moritz Renner, The Public and the Private Dimensions of 
Transnational Commercial Law, 10 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1341 (2009). 
17 See, e.g., the program on “Transnational Judicial Dialogue“, carried out under the auspices of the American 
Society of International Law (http://www.asil.org/transnational-judicial-dialogue.cfm - last visited 28 August 2013): 
“Through formal and informal networks, judges from jurisdictions and courts around the world are engaged in a 
transnational dialogue on strengthening international judicial cooperation, improving the coherence of international 
and national law, and advancing the rule of law and respect for human dignity on a global scale.” Id. 
18 Anne D’Innocenzio, Wal-Mart extends health care benefits to workers‘ domestic partners, including same-sex, 28 
August 2013, HUFFINGTON POST, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/08/27/wal-mart-extends-health-
c_n_3825793.html?utm_hp_ref=canada-style 
19 http://corporate.walmart.com/our-story/locations (last visited 28 August 2013) 
of environmental20, commercial21 or financial regulation22 suggests that the lines between private 
actors (without law making authority) and public ones (with such authority) are not as neatly 
drawn as some might think. Depending on whether we would attribute a legal character to Wal-
Mart the next question would be indeed to rethink the status of such a norm-producing actor or 
entity, its public or private character. As Legal Realists have long ago argued23, such a reflection 
is especially important where real social consequences follow from such “abstract” legal 
categorization.24 
In this article I am interested in this particular constellation of what I want to call “political legal 
theory”25 and the today fast proliferating field of ‘transnational regulatory governance’26, both of 
which I hope to eventually integrate and conceptualize as Transnational Sociological 
Jurisprudence. In the following, I argue for the need to engage in particular processes of 
“translation” in order to more adequately grasp the dynamics as well as consequences of 
allegedly clearly defined legal-regulatory areas with their corresponding epistemologies 
(captured through their depiction as legal “fields”). In previous work, I have been interested in 
the identification of “translation categories” – using the examples of Actors, Norms, and 
Processes – to capture the theoretical and conceptual challenges arising in a context where are 
called upon to offer legal analysis and doctrinal assessments in a framework very different from 
                                                          
20 See Yasmine Chahed, Translations in Regulatory Space: The Arenas of Regulatory Innovation in Accounting 
Standard-Setting, 21 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD.____ (2014) [this issue]; see also Michael Power, Constructing the 
Responsible Organization: Accounting and Environmental Representation, in: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION 369 
(Teubner/Farmer/Murphy, eds., 1994); Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of 
Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 
297 (2007). 
21 Jens Wüstemann/Sonja Kierzek, Transnational legalization of accounting: the case of international financial 
reporting standards, in: LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 33 (Brütsch/Lehmkuhl, eds., 
2007); Walter Mattli, Public and Private Governance in Setting International Accounting Standards, in: 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 199 (Kahler/Lake, eds., 2003). 
22 See, e.g., Michael S. Barr/Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2006); Caroline Bradley, Private International Law-Making for the Financial 
Markets, 29 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 127 (2005). 
23 Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 603 (1943); Roscoe 
Pound, The New Feudalism, 16 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 553 (1932). 
24 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale Law Journal 655 (1926); for a 
review of this strain of legal realist analysis for contract and corporate law, see Peer Zumbansen, The Law of 
Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 191 (2007), and Peer 
Zumbansen/Simon Archer, The BCE Decision: Reflections on the Firm as a Contractual Organization, CLPE 
COMPARATIVE RESEARCH IN LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH PAPER available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160094 (2008). 
25 Here, I am much inspired by Rudolf Wiethölter’s longstanding analysis of the correlation between political, 
sociological and economic analysis of law. See, e.g., Rudolf Wiethölter, Social Science Models in Economic Law, 
in: CONTRACT AND ORGANISATION. LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY 52 
(Daintith/Teubner, eds., 1986), as well as Rudolf Wiethölter, Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law, 
in: DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 221 (Teubner, ed., 1986).  
26 A landmark contribution to this debate continues to be Claire Cutler’s study of the institutional and political 
dimensions of lex mercatoria: A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL 
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2003). 
that of a (Western) nation state, marked by evolving conceptions of the state, the rule of law, 
notions of the separation of powers and a system of normative hierarchy, with some form of 
constitutional text or order at the pinacle of the pyramid.27 In the present context, translation is 
seen to occur in two ways: first in the form of the Legal Realist confrontation of legal norms with 
their invisibilized social realities, secondly through a close study of the ways in which the 
content and boundaries of legal fields are being drawn and justified. The key here is a 
contextualization of lawyers’ demarcation discourses as concerns the function and boundaries of 
particular legal areas (“fields”) in a never fully disclosed or disclosable realm of epistemological 
conceptualization. What – in the domestic context – would, for example, justify a strict 
separation between labor law on the one hand and corporate law, on the other? We should know 
and did already know for a long time28, that the justification of distinguishing between these two 
legal fields, despite its “functional” persuasiveness29 is at its core political. As will be shown 
later in this article, similar justificatory moves occur in both emerging and maturing transnational 
legal fields: the here chosen examples of law & development and transitional justice do 
poignantly mirror the same thrust of arguments mobilized to distinguish their respective 
regulatory function. It is by approximating these fields that we can see more clearly how the 
construction of a legal field results in the creation of a tightly structured, hermetically closed 
political universe. 
But, as I want to show in the following, this attention to politics does not go far enough. What 
today is most frequently being associated with the need to expand law’s interdisciplinary 
capacity30, is in fact only the surface of a more comprehensive crisis of law’s epistemological 
foundations.  On the one hand, from a legal-sociological perspective, we find an increasingly 
fuzzy relationship between allegedly “public” and “private” actors involved in the formulation 
and implementation as well as enforcement of norms. But, while this proliferation of private 
regulatory actors is as such not a novelty given its historical precursors31, its particular 
appearance in the context of the continuing crisis and transformation of the New Deal’s and the 
post-war Welfare State’s regulatory aspirations32 requires a comprehensive analyis that would 
                                                          
27 Compare Peer Zumbansen, Lochner Disembedded: The Anxieties of Law in a Global Context, 20 INDIANA 
JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 29 (2013), 54-60. 
28 ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954); William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, 
and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 59 (2005); Fenner L. Stewart, Berle’s 
Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A Forgotten Perspective for Reconsideration During The Rise of Finance, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1457 (2011) 
29 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL 655 (1926); 
William W. Bratton, The 'Nexus of Contracts' Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 407 
(1989); Simon Deakin, 'Enterprise-risk': the juridical nature of the firm revisited, 32 INDUSTRIAL LAW JOURNAL 97 
(2003). 
30 See, e.g., NYU’s 2012-2013 Hauser Colloquium program, focusing on an interdisciplinary analysis to place legal 
theory in the interdisciplinary context of global governance: 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/colloquia/hauserglobal (last visited 28 August 2013). 
31 See, e.g., Louis Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 201 (1937); Karl Llewellyn, 
What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE LAW JOURNAL 704 (1930). 
32 Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 342 (2004); for an intriguing analysis of the current privatization and 
effectively revisit and reinvigorate the Legal Realists’ pondering on the hidden politics of de-
politicizing markets33, contracts34 and families.35 The first strand of analysis in this article is thus 
an attempt to connect the contemporary politics over post-Welfare State regulatory governance 
with earlier contentions as to the ideological basis of market-state demarcations. On the other 
hand, such analysis must prove adequate in the face of a fundamentally transformed institutional 
environment as it presents itself in the form of today’s “disembeddedness” of the nation state’s 
regulatory and adjudicatory apparatus.36 The disaggregation of a wide range of state regulatory 
functions and processes37 presents, thus, a formidable challenge and laboratory for the study of 
the doctrinal, conceptual as well as ethical and political dimensions of norm creation and 
implementation.38  
At the heart of this article is thus the correlation between a “political” critique of legal theory and 
an analysis of the relationship between law and governance in a transnational context. It is 
through the mobilization of the idea of “translation” that I hope to be able to show how 
contemporary calls for a more interdisciplinary study of law can barely scratch the surface of 
what is in fact a far deeper-reaching political crisis of law, a crisis that is one of law’s 
epistomological basis. Against this background, the agenda is a relatively straight forward one. 
Once the importance of the Realists’ political critique of legal formalism is reintroduced, the task 
consists in reflecting on the challenges arising in the attempt to apply their lessons to 
contemporary arenas of transnational governance. The concept of translation will be unfolded in 
two ways: the first is to revisit the ubiquitous reference to “public” and “private” in a by now 
well-established “law & society” mode, which builds on legal realism and places law as a social 
theory enterprise in an ever-further differentiated social science context.39 But, we need to look 
at the challenges of a thus operating law & society approach that risks simultaneously fetichizing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
contractualization politics in local welfare deregulation, see Alfred E. Aman Jr., Privatization in Indiana, 20 IND J 
GLOB LEG STUD ___ (2013).  
33 Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
QUARTERLY 470 (1923) 
34 Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 553 (1932); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the 
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LAW JOURNAL 997 (1985); Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation 
and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOYOLA CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL 175 (2009) 
35 Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
1497 (1983) 
36 Zumbansen, Lochner Disembedded, supra, note ___  
37 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government 
Networks, 39 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 159 (2004); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory 
Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (2009) 
38 Colin Scott, Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism, EUI WORKING PAPERS. ROBERT 
SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES, Private Regulation Series-02 http://ucd (2010); see also the 
contributions to Colin Scott/Fabrizio Cafaggi/Linda Senden (ed.^eds.), The Challenge of Transnational Private 
Regulation: Conceptual and Constitutional Debates. Symposium Issue of the JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Vol. 
38, No. 1, pp. 1-188 (2011), and Peer Zumbansen, The Ins and Outs of Transnational Private Regulatory 
Governance: Legitimacy, Accountability, Effectiveness and a New Concept of ‘Context’, 13 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 
1269 (2012). 
39 For a very fruitful application in the context of globalization, see now EVE DARIAN-SMITH, LAWS AND SOCIETIES 
IN GLOBAL CONTEXTS (2013). 
and diffusing the “political” thrust that drove the Legal Realists’ project. In light of this 
challenge, the present frontier of a renewed law & society approach in the light of already made 
advances in sociology, philosophy and STS40 lies, in my understanding, in how to more 
effectively engage legal doctrine and legal theory in a dialogue with those disciplines that place 
the questionable, fragmentary and precarious nature of knowledge at the center of their inquiry. 
This “turn to knowledge” as a task for legal theory turns, in a second step, practical when we 
study the establishment and demarcation of legal fields in contexts that are above all marked by 
the absence of the earlier available reference points for nation-state embedded legal governance. 
In other words, to the degree that fields such as law & development and transitional justice are 
being constructed and distinguished from one another by using the old, traditional 
conceptualizations of (a-political) markets, (interventionist and, as such, market processes 
disrupting) states, (self-interested( individuals, (private) corporations and (contractualized) 
employees in the realm of the first field (L&D) and the rule of law, reconciliation, prosecution 
and healing in that of the other (TJ), a Legal Realist inspired critique of the “hidden politics” 
might not prove sufficient to grasp what really lies at the center of these fields. Ultimately, I will 
argue that both L&D and TJ are mere facets of the way in which legal theory today engages with 
a complex regulatory as well as normative-ethical reality. Using the concept of translation in the 
described two ways will allow us to see more clearly how distinctions between public and 
private, political and non-political elements of this reality are closely linked to distinctions 
between legal and non-legal forms of social ordering. Underlying these distinctions is a firece 
struggle over different utopia, over competing and likely mutually exclusive models of society 
and human community41, a struggle about the violence of which the lawyers’ distinction between 
“relevant” and “irrelevant” social facts in court proceedings gives little to no indication.42 
A central contention of this article is that the future development of ‘law and globalization’ will 
significantly be shaped by the way that scholars in law and other social sciences are able to 
further integrate the respective investigations into foundations and methodology, that are under 
way in each discipline, as we speak. The prospect of updating and adapting a primarily nation-
state focused legal discipline to its operation in a global context includes the initiations of 
concentrated thought exchanges about the different, recognizable approaches to make sense, 
above all, of the challenges posed by globalization for law and other social sciences. For a 
                                                          
40 Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of 
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Latour, From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik, or How to make things public, in: MAKING THINGS PUBLIC. ATMOSPHERES 
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41 For a brillant depiction of this point, see Roger Cotterrell, Spectres of Transnationalism: Changing Terrains of 
Sociology of Law, 36 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 481 (2009), and for an insightful engagement with Cotterrell’s 
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42 It is this angle of analysis that is also proving crucial and helpful in the ongoing shifts of moral and 
epistemological justifications for changes in the law: a powerful example is Jothie Rajah’s analysis of the emergence 
of a particular legal epistemology based on which the targeted killing of terrorists becomes a legal possibility. See 
Rajah, Sinister Translations: Law’s Authority in a Post-9/11 World, 21 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. ____ (2014) [this 
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conversation across disciplinary boundaries to take flight, it is advisable to give a better picture 
of law and the current state of legal research (and, contemporary developments in legal 
education). The following list identifies a number of thematic clusters that capture the different 
aspects of contemporary debates around law and globalization. My contention is that, taken 
together, these clusters constitute elements of an emerging legal theory of global governance. 
Such a theory, to be sure, is no longer a legal theory in its own right, but a social theory of law. 
And it is in that light, that we are now experiencing a strange mixture of both déja-vu and 
innovation in the engagements between legal theory and social sciences. If we dared to apply a 
label to these developments, we could venture that of a transition from ‘law & society’ to ‘law & 
globalization’, with the term ‘transition’ marking less of a substitute and replacement than an 
evolution, a maturing and continuing differentiation. That said, however, it is clear that the 
challenges arising from the first phase of law & society are likely to echo in the current iteration 
of law & globalization. In other words, the pressing questions as to the methodology to unfold 
the relation between “law” and “society” cannot be considered obsolete. What remains the same, 
is the need to demarcate and motivate the contours of each and the boundaries between them. 
This brings us back to the rediscovery of legal sociology in the 1960s and 1970s, the rise of a 
scientifically driven criminology as one of the launching pads and benchmarks for what result in 
a fast proliferating field of victimology, critical criminal law theory, implementation and context 
studies etc. At the same time, “legal pluralism”, while echoing a lot of the early legal 
anthropologists’ and legal sociologists’ interests in indigenous legal orders or customary law43, 
became a very ambitious theoretical and practical endavor in the critical analysis of regulatory 
regimes in mature welfare states.44 Today, the resurgence of law & society through the prism of 
law & globalization reminds us of these demarcation efforts while pushing us to recontextualize 
such concerns in a newly expanded environment – jurisdictionally and geographically45, 
geopolitically46 and from an epistemological standpoint.47 What has changed in comparasion 
between the 1960s/1970s constellation and the present time, is that the target areas of much of 
the just mentioned legal sociological, anthropological and critical work have become de-centred, 
as it were, shifting from a largely state-centred analytical universe to one of hybrid regulatory 
arenas, described,  variably as international ‘regimes’48, transnational ‘spaces’49, fragmented 
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45 Richard Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 843 (1999); Gunther 
Handl/Joachim Zekoll/Peer Zumbansen (ed.^eds.), BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY 
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der Global Governance: Mehr Weltstaatlichkeit, weniger Demokratie?, in: SOZIALE WELT (SONDERBAND 18): 
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47 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Abyssal Thinking. From global lines to ecologies of knowledge, EUROZINE 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007 (2007); DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE. POSTCOLONIAL 
THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE, 2ND ED. [orig. 2000] (2007); JEAN COMAROFF/JOHN L. COMAROFF, 
THEORY FROM THE SOUTH: OR, HOW EURO-AMERICA IS EVOLVING TOWARD AFRICA (THE RADICAL IMAGINATION) 
(2011), especially ch 1, where C&C lay out the different theoretical strands that inform their thesis. 
48 Stephen D. Krasner (ed.^eds.), International Regimes (2001). 
49 SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY - AUTHORITY - RIGHTS. FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006). 
legal orders50 or ‘collisions’.51 This shift results in what might be called a ‘disembedding’ of 
nation-state or jurisdiction-oriented analytical and conceptual approaches. Explanatory 
frameworks employed to structure and analyze core institutional features of state-based legal 
regimes such as the ‘rule of law’, the ‘separation of powers’ principle or the ideas of a 
constitutional order or, simply, normative hierarchy threaten to miss the unique architectural 
structure of emerging global governance regimes. It is this disembedding of state-based 
conceptual toolkits that prompts not so much a full-blown crafting of a ‘new’ language52,  but a 
constant exersice in adaptation, building on reflexive exercises in (discourse-regime-system) 
translation53 as well as the continuing engagements with the tension between ‘government’ and 
‘governance’ discourses from in different social science disciplines .54  
 
Such developments can be seen as forming the backdrop for the next stages of ‘globalization 
studies’, which will in all likelihood lead to an ever higher degree of interdisciplinary pollination. 
For the purposes of the present project it is necessary to keep this rich background in mind, while 
continuing the efforts to draw more concrete lessons from this engagement for one’s own 
discipline. This interest in ‘one’s own’ may be justified in light of the consideration that 
disciplinary frameworks evolve both internally and externally and as such have an inherent 
quality of instability that needs to be kept in mind when employing its tools and concepts – 
however critically such employment may be occurring. What evolutionary theorists have referred 
as the tension between ‘routine’ and ‘innovation’55, legal scholars have depicted as a state of 
‘critical instability’, for example in the case of a normative framework that is rich in its 
conceptual and, as a result, symbolic aspiration, while being under constant threat of being 
demasked as farcical or worse in light of the unlegitimizable environment its norms have helped 
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IN WORLD GOVERNMENT (1992); IAN AYRES/JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
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JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 1-188 (2011). 
55 See, for example, Niklas Luhmann, Evolution und Geschichte, in: ders., SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLÄRUNG 2 150 
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creating.56 While this instability of theoretical frameworks which results from internal and 
external challenges57 might be identified and recognized, the necessary ‘next’ step is often much 
harder to formulate. Law’s relationship to (global) society is one such constellation in which a 
crisis of law is widely acknowledged, yet nothing like a consensus is emerging in terms of how 
to respondto that crisis.58 Despite this, it is possible to identify a number of thematic clusters 
which are constantly recurring in related debates about law’s status in a global context. These 
clusters are helpful in distinguishing different dimensions of the  law-globalization relationship 
which the present article seeks to address. Among these clusters we find: 
 
 the state-law nexus and the frequently associated distinction between a (legally 
structured and operating) state and a (purportedly self-regulatory) society 
 the alleged elusiveness of transposing nation state-based concepts such as the ‘Rule of 
Law’, ‘Separation of Powers’ or ‘Normative [Constitutional] Hierarchy’ into the global 
sphere [the distinction of domestic and global law] 
 the relationship between (formal, institutionalized) law and (informal, ‘social’) norms 
[the law/non-law distinction] 
 the fate of the concept of ‘legitimacy’ in an evolving global legal order [the normative 
status of global law] 
 the politics of global law [eg the tension between progressive and conservative 
endorsements of concepts such as the Rule of Law] 
 the legal-philosophical ‘foundations’ of law in distinction from law seen through the 
lens of sociological or regulatory theory [the interdisciplinary understanding of law] 
The identified clusters underscore the earlier made observation that the relationship of ‘law and 
globalization’ is in fact a label for a multi-layered and multi-tiered theoretical analysis of 
contemporary social order, as formulated from the in itself unstable epistemological position of 
law. The purposes of the present project are to further investigate the nature of this instability 
through a series of applications. Part II of the article sets the stage of the following analysis by 
initiating an investigation into the evolution of law and ‘socio-legal studies’. Part III builds on 
this and looks more closely at one of the currently most vibrant discursive playgrounds in socio-
legal studies ‘gone global’, namely Transnational Law [TL]. TL is here studied above all from a 
methodological perspective, understanding the emergence of this ‘field’ as an attempt to make 
sense of law’s doctrinal, conceptual and interdisciplinary adaptations to globalization. The next 
two parts (IV, V) analyze the role of information and knowledge in the context of this emerging 
legal-regulatory concept of TL by looking more closely at both ‘facts’ and ‘norms’. The core 
contention in this part of the article is that while there is an inherently political dimension to the 
identification and selection of relevant/irrelevant facts on the one hand and the recognition 
versus dismissal of legal/non-legal norms, on the other, it remains frustratingly difficult to 
adequately capture or address the nature of this political dimension. It is the ambiguous, illusive 
                                                          
56 SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW. DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS 
OF UNIVERSALITY (2011); Jothie Rajah, The Gulf Between Promise and Claim: Understanding International Law's 
Failure to Decolonise, 3 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 285 (2012). 
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nature of both the political status and framework that I am here most interested in, as I am trying 
to further build on similar insights from other scholars.59 Part VI, then, introduces two legal 
‘fields’, ‘arenas’, ‘sub-disciplines’ – ‘law & development’ on the one hand, ‘transitional justice’, 
on the other – which may illustrate how law has become an increasingly interdisciplinary, 
‘unstable’ discipline, the merits of which can be realized only in accepting its unstable nature as 
an unavoidable consequence from law’s engagement with its environment. Part VII deepens this 
analysis by revisiting the earlier findings regarding the role of knowledge in legal governance, 
but now scrutinizing the particular role in these two overarching, dynamic areas. Finally, part 
VIII reiterates the argument for an understanding of TL not as a field, but as a contemporary 
methodological engagement. This, in consequence, leads to the emergence of a differentiated 
analytical framework – under the label of ‘transnational legal sociology’ – with the help of which 
it might be possible to think further about the connections and intersections between legal 
doctrine, legal sociology and social sciences in the present era. 
 
 
II. STRANGE BEDFOLLOWS, OR: A COHABITATION WITH UNCERTAIN EFFECTS: 
“SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES” 
 
Under the constant nagging at the conceptual citadels of legal coherence and unity60 by social-
scientific insights, law eventually morphed into an unbound universe of ‘socio-legal’ studies. 
Similar to other hybrid scholarly endeavors61, the ambiguity of the politics that are at work in the 
generation, formation and consolidation of such fields results from both conceptualization and 
impact. The crushing of categories is no longer confined to the internal architecture of a theory, 
but attains explosive, uncontainable potential in the artificial ‘outside’.62 The here pursued 
interest in “translation” is central to such a political perspective on socio-legal studies. Today, 
however, the translations between different realms and universes of knowledge have become 
especially complex, as the centrality of purportedly “technical” knowledge in legal norm creation 
and decision making is likely to complicate otherwise well-reasoned attempts to separate 
doctrinal from “ethical”, “moral”, “political” dimensions of law.63 With this in mind, the article 
is interested in both the trajectories and the politics of conceptual change in law’s efforts to adapt 
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to globalization. As such, our interest must reach beyond the obvious political categorization of 
assertions that globalization has (rightly64 or regrettably65) put an end to state sovereignty. 
Instead, the more important task seems to be to better understand the discursive universe in 
which globalization is associated either with the death of law (as collateral damage from the 
decline of the state) or the resurgence of law as a flexible regulatory asset in globalizing markets. 
Such an understanding cannot be gained from a single vantage point. While the analysis of the 
contested status and role of law in global governance is partly an important concern of 
sociologists and political scientists, the motivations as well as underlying assumptions that guide 
regulatory scholars – as de facto political philosophers – in their confidence in law in a domestic 
context as opposed to the frequently voiced fear of falling into a global void might be better 
understood through the lenses of (however crude behavioral) psychology66 or political 
philosophy.67 But only in a combination of these different disciplinary lenses does it seem 
possible to arrive at halfway appropriate observations of the emerging global regulatory order. 
That said, the contention here is that a legal theory of global governance cannot escape its 
interdisciplinary reformulation, precisely because its categories have come under such close 
scrutiny. 
 
Meanwhile, the analysis of law’s engagement with globalization can rest, at least for the time 
being, on a number of reference points. One of these is the distinction between ‘domestic’ and 
‘international’, which – despite its questionable explanatory status in the long run68 – serves as a 
productive framework to identify differently bounded regulatory discourses. Against that 
background, it is possible to get closer to the ‘politics’ that accompany the emergence of legal 
fields, which are in themselves neither ‘here’ nor ‘there’, in that they are constantly transgressing 
the boundaries between the nation-state and the global realm.69 Two such fields will be in the 
centre of the forthcoming analysis, namely the in themselves unruly and seemingly boundary-
less fields of Law & Development and Transitional Justice. By looking more closely at the 
continuing conceptualization of these areas, including their trials and tribulations as law school 
curriculum entities, it can be shown how the conflict between progressive and conservative 
politics, well-known from nation state-based disputes over the aims of legal governance in 
different regulatory areas, is repeating itself in the transnational arena.70 This transnational 
replay of domestic tensions between progressive versus conservative politics in the global arena 
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can be shown by short-circuiting related debates within the nation-state context on the one hand 
and within transnational or global governance discourses, on the other. Because the latter is often 
described as distinctly different from the domestic sphere in light of the absence of a functioning, 
institutionalized rule of law, a normative-constitutional framework or hierarchy or an adequately 
designed system of norm-enforcement, the politics of global law are often depicted as being 
fatally troubled with questions of legitimacy, access to justice, or human rights universalism.  
Meanwhile, it is within the nation-state that the political dimension of legal theory is most 
frequently associated with crude demarcations of ‘public’ versus ‘private’ spheres of regulatory 
sovereignty or with claims over contested territory, associated either with state ‘interventionism’ 
or societal ‘self-regulation’.71 Law reconceived as ‘socio-legal studies’ can be seen as a 
continuing effort to formulate this dependency of law’s meaning (its ‘politics’) from the context 
in which it is being evoked. It is this sense of embeddedness that was crucial in the formation of 
legal sociological analysis of law over time. The task at this point in time is how to adequately 
capture the challenge arising from law’s globalization, how to build on or reject categories and 
instruments internal to law as a scholarly discipline, how to relate and, possibly, adapt its 
conceptual framework to other disciplines’ insights into the nature of global governance and 
what lessons to draw from such engagements for law – as a field of doctrine, practice, education 
and research.72  
 
III. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS AN ENGAGEMENT WITH GLOBALIZATION 
 
In a recent chapter for an essay collection on ‘Law and Social Theory’, Ralf Michaels, a 
prominent participant in the discussions around ‘global legal pluralism’73, surmises that 
globalization has become the definitive framing operative of the ‘law of our time’.74 An 
informed, cursory overview of the challenges arising for law and legal theory from globalization 
– above all law’s ties to the concept and the institutions of the Western nation-state – then 
follows this assumption. At the end of the chapter, Michaels appears to simultaneously dismiss 
and endorse a reading of ‘transnational law’ [TL] as a theory or a methodological framework in 
its own right.75 Instead, he suggests that “if anything, transnational law is a description of what 
we find empirically as law beyond the state, and a theoretical conceptualization of law after the 
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breakdown of methodological nationalism. Transnational law describes a starting point, not an 
endpoint, of thinking about law.”76 
 
I take the apparent ambiguity of this position as an expression of a dilemma, which we – as legal 
scholars and de facto social scientists – are facing almost at every turn in our attempt to adapt the 
conceptual and theoretical instruments of our discipline to the unruly phenomena of 
globalization. In turn, ‘globalization’, as Gunther Teubner noted almost twenty years ago, should 
rightly be seen as the ultimate deconstructor, which in fact turns every dearly held assumption 
and foundation of law as a discipline on its head.77 As Michaels observes, globalization “has 
remained a remarkably vague concept in general discourse’.78 While this observation seems to be 
on point when we take into consideration the wide-ranging assessments and appropriations of the 
term, conceptually, politically, theoretically,79 we still must ask: whether the problem is this lack 
of definition. After all, if it is true, to the least, that ‘we are all realists now’ (W Singer), why 
then further invest our energy into definition games. We know well enough that these only raise 
further questions as to who does the defining, to which purpose and to which effect? In that light, 
it appears perhaps more productive to embrace the phenomena which are being associated, for a 
number of reasons, with ‘globalization’, as challenges to the foundations of established 
epistemologies and ways of seeing the world. Surely, the ability to “see”, and then to “know”, in 
and of itself is neither an asset nor a self-explanatory competence. That much, we ought to have 
learned.80 
 
From such a starting point, Michaels’ assertion of TL merely capturing what we “find 
empirically” can be qualified further to hint at the very problem of how we ought to use 
frameworks such as a particular theory, an analytical concept or – as in the case of TL – a ‘field’ 
within a discipline, to describe (and, to construct) reality. Apart from the question of 
epistemology and the status of empirical socio-legal studies81, the other part of Michaels’ 
statement deserves equal attention, namely where he refers to ‘law beyond the state’.82 If 
anything, law’s engagement with globalization has been determined by the category of the state 
and its significance for our understanding of law. That is precisely what Michaels depicts as (the 
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and Law's Knowledge: Reflections from Legal Sociology and Legal Theory, 10 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 417 (2009). 
82 Michaels, supra, note 74, at 1. 
need to question and, eventually, overcome) law’s ‘methodological nationalism’. So far, so good. 
But, now, where do we ‘start’, as Michaels suggests at the end of his paper, that we should?  
 
In contrast, I want to suggest that whether or not TL is a theory in its own right or whether legal 
pluralism [LP], sharing with TL a keen interest in social norms and in the tension between ‘law’ 
and ‘non-law’83, should be seen as helpful84, we ought to acknowledge frameworks and 
approaches such as TL or LP as elements in what Michaels appropriately, in my view describes 
as a reconstruction, of ‘law as social science’. As such, the boundaries of law as a discipline tend 
to be drawn and redrawn in light of challenges, whose status is inevitably going to be as 
contested and open for further deconstruction just as the nature of law itself. In other words – but 
it might just be a theoretically obviously and trite point – there is no fixed point from which it 
would be possible to treat law as a ‘given’ and then to analyze how it changes under the 
influence of outside pressures. The problem of law’s boundaries, its content, scope and nature 
has always already been part of law’s definition. Michaels’ suggestion to capture the scope of 
law as it unfolds under conditions of globalization through the study of three determinants or, 
anchor points – ‘territory’, ‘population/citizenship’ and ‘government’ is well-suited to explore 
the inchoate ways in which legal categories become intertwined social scientific depictions. 
Building on these three mini-excursions, we are able to see how a set of reference points that 
play an important role in law, are revisited and, in turn, reconfigured and expropriated by an 
immensely rich assembly of non-legal analytics that capture their sociological, philosophical, 
political, anthropological or geographical dimensions. Again, the ensuing question is what the 
consequences are for law. That question in itself is new only with regard to the context, in which 
it is posed. That this context is labeled as globalization suggests that it is a different context from 
that (of the nation state) in which questions regarding the relationship between law and social 
developments or, more generally, between law and society, have previously been asked. 
 
Globalization and the various conceptual steps that have been taken by lawyers and socio-legal 
scholars towards making sense of globalization’s impact on law appear to place the investigation 
on an entirely new and distinct foundation. It is against such a background that we might be able 
to appreciate the anxiety that shines through proclamations such as “If everything is transnational 
law, nothing really is.”85 Michaels qualifies this statement by referring to a use of TL as 
encompassing “all legal (and non-legal!) rules”86, while underlining that his preferred reading  of 
TL, as we alluded to earlier, is one of a description of empirically found instantiations of “law 
beyond the state” and as a “theoretical conceptualization of law after the breakdown of 
methodological nationalism.”87 
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or the Black Hole for Modern Legal Positivism, SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=2251017 (2013), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2251017, ms. 2, referring to the “black hole represented by legal globalization (and its legal 
pluralism), a black hole where the distinction between law and non-law (i.e. the major tenant of legal positivism and, 
I would dare say, of the modern Western legal culture) seems to vanish, putting the very existence and legitimacy of 
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87 Id. 
The problem with these qualifications is that they tend to abbreviate and curtail necessary 
inquiries rather than productively draw on the different already existing investigative strands that 
have been developing in recent years and that have been benefitting from a increasingly serious 
engagement across from different disciplinary boundaries. The level of complexity that the work 
carried out under the label of ‘socio-legal studies’ has reached at this point, strongly suggests that 
we should no longer hope for any ‘easy scores’ or apodictic truths in this theoretical game. In 
that vein, it is important to point out and to acknowledge that definitions of otherwise unbound, 
experimental frameworks – such as TL – always carry the risk of inadequately reducing 
complexity. But, they nevertheless have to be taken seriously as evolutionary steps in theory-
building that is driven by a coalescence of factors. In the area of legal ‘fields’, such factors 
comprise the constant tension between the ‘law on the books’ and the ‘law in action’88, the 
‘exhaustion’ of conceptual, analytical and doctrinal categories and instruments in the face of 
competing interpretations of social ‘facts’,89 as well as the recognized need to adapt or expand an 
existing legal framework to a burgeoning set of technological, social, cultural developments.90 
Because law that does not adapt to its times, will wither away, we can see these tensions as well 
as the attempts to address them to have been marking any field of law – including contract, tort, 
property or civil procedure: all of these have seen such sieges to their citadels of purported 
coherence and rationality. As keen observers have pointed out for example in the case of private 
law, the politics of this game of constant change were not first prompted by the emergence of 
globe-spanning regulatory regimes91, but started long before. Against that background, who 
wants to still define what contract (property, constitutional law etc etc) law really are, aim for 
and are designed to demarcate, protect and empower?  
 
Transnational law [TL] is just one result of such ongoing attempts to update law and its 
categorical architecture to fast-moving societal developments. From that viewpoint, the ‘body’ of 
TL is driven by the tension as well as by the co-existence of law [legal] and non-law [non-legal 
rules] as they characterize contemporary regulatory regimes.92 But that does not define TL; 
rather, it is but one element of the concept that gives rise to the field. Understood, instead, as a 
theoretical platform, or laboratory, TL allows us to study the ways in which this tension actually 
unfolds, the forms and instances through which this coexistence occurs and the instances where 
legal categories become infiltrated by meanings from other disciplinary discourses. In other 
words, TL should be seen as doing the exact opposite of equating or leveling legal and non-legal 
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rules. The contention is that TL, instead, problematizes the correlation between both normative 
universes93 in that it opens up an increasingly diffused and complex regulatory landscape to a 
comprehensive assessment of the status and the function of norms (legal or non-legal) inside but 
also outside legal doctrine. For example, rather than contending that the transnational law 
merchant – the ‘lex mercatoria’ encompasses the entire universe of legal and non-legal rules in 
the field of transnational commercial regulation and governance, TL highlights the interaction 
between legal and non-legal rules in the governance of transnational societal activity.94 
  
IV. THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW PROJECT SCRUTINIZES LAW’S ‘KNOWLEDGE’ PROBLEM 1: FACTS 
 
This leads us to the second contention: if TL is a framework to investigate the correlation 
between legal and non-legal norms, then it is not just more, but also something different from a 
mere ‘description’ of norms that can empirically be ‘found’, as alluded to by Michaels. TL 
problematizes the way in which such finding occurs each time. For example, it is from this 
perspective that we can recognize the factor of agency in identifying and selecting “applicable” 
norms in transnational constellations.95 Meanwhile, from the perspective of TL it becomes 
possible to revisit established as well as emerging interpretations of jurisdictional norms: for 
example, the contested applicability of the U.S. American Alien Tort Statute of 178996 in the 
context of transnational human rights litigation97 is squarely situated in the nexus between ‘legal’ 
norms and TL’s concerns with the identification and interpretation of norms in accordance to the 
transnational nature of the underlying issues.98 
 
A further contention as regards the ‘finding’ of law’s instantiation beyond the state can be made 
with reference to the ways in which judges in cases – be they domestic or involve transnational 
reach – distinguish between relevant and irrelevant facts. For example, Judge Posner’s opinion 
in the 2011 Flomo decision is a case in point in that regard. Reviewing the applicability of 
several ILO conventions to the labor practices ‘found’ at the Firestone Rubber Plantation in 
Liberia, Judge Posner at various points acknowledged the lack of sufficient ‘information’ or 
‘knowledge’ with regard to the labor practices on the ground, but did not hesitate to still decide 
on the inapplicability of the conventions.99 From the perspective of TL the question of the factual 
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99 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co. LL.C., 643 F.3d 1013 (2011), eg at 1023: “They can assure fulfillment by 
hiring other poor Liberians to help them; and because Firestone's Liberian employees are paid well by local 
basis on which decisions regarding the qualification of norms as applicable, non applicable are 
made is crucial. The importance here lies distinctly no longer alone in the question whether or 
not a particular ILO convention is applicable, but how the decision of a norm’s applicability is 
shaped by a more comprehensive and adequate understanding of the regulatory regime that in 
fact governs the scenario on the ground, which gave rise to the “case” in the first place. In other 
words, the application of a legal norm never occurs in a vacuum, but instead must be seen as an 
intervention into an already existing normative system, made up of both ‘official’ and ‘inofficial’ 
norms. But, the significance of this rudimentary legal pluralist assertion becomes recognizable 
even from a cursory look behind the obvious facts in a case. In the example of the rubber 
plantation at the center of the Flomo decision, one quickly begins to wonder about the 
consequences for the legal assessment of the case’s facts that follow from a consideration of the 
history of the corporate defendant’s almost century-long involvement in the country.100 The facts 
about which the deciding judge recognized to know ‘too little’ were in fact available, but only if 
one began to see the case at hand in a broader context, namely in a context that was rich in 
relevant data and facts. The crucial element of contrasting the case that the Judge had before him 
with a case ‘study’ of the actually existing context and environment of the ‘case’ lies in the 
recognition of the limits of the epistemological categories that informed the construction of the 
case. The case study, by contrast, does not simply apply established categories to first depict and 
then to legally assess the interests found to be in obvious conflict (as, for example, between 
employee and employer, worker and factory owner, or two contracting parties101). Instead, its 
purpose is to highlight the gap between the categories (employee, worker, contractor) and the 
reality that shapes the case. This gap has been identified as law’s legitimacy deficit from a range 
of theoretical-political viewpoints, with the Interest Jurisprudence’s attack on legal positivism in 
late 19th century Germany102 and the Legal Realist attack on legal formalism103 merely being 
early instantiations of such efforts. In the attempt to better understand this context it is necessary 
to begin to recognize it as being itself the result of both a detailed field study of work and life 
conditions on the ground and a comprehensive reconstruction of the historical, socio-economic 
as well as political factors that have shaped the ‘conditions’ of the existing labor practices. While 
this dimension encompasses what we might call the political economy of the company’s actual 
operation in the region, the community as well as government and stakeholder relations104, what 
also becomes visible then is how the labor practices at a plantation such as Firestone’s in Liberia 
are shaped by a multitude of regulatory norms that shape the employees’, their dependants’, and 
their peers’ relations with regard to the company. Without taking into account this reality of 
these complex relationships between the company and its various stakeholders, a label now 
attached to a group significantly broader than that encompassing the company’s official 
employees, no adequate assessment regarding the ‘labor practices’ on the ground can in fact be 
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104 See eg César Rodríguez-Garavito, Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior 
Consultation in Social Minefields, 18 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 263 (2011). 
made. As ethnographic and political science accounts have shown, the regulatory universe of 
multinational operations in certain locales is itself transnational in its reach and its local effects 
can only be studied by understanding this complex relation between the local and transnational 
normative sphere.105 Simultaneously, this is the reason why there is never a moment where we 
can refer to norms that we ‘find empirically as law beyond the state’. While, on the one hand, we 
may identify, collect and categorize norms of different status and quality as shaping a particular 
regulatory area, the selection and ranking of those norms we find applicable and determinative in 
a given context, on the other, remains a matter of agency and choice. 
 
V. THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW PROJECT SCRUTINIZES LAW’S ‘KNOWLEDGE’ PROBLEM 2: NORMS 
 
The previous section has ended in a reference to the intersecting local and transnational, official 
and inofficial, hard and soft norms which characterize regulatory arenas such as contemporary 
labor governance of multinational companies’ operations in the third world. We have applied this 
lens to commence an investigation into the ways in which the lawyer in such situations can 
identify, choose and mobilize norms of different origin and status.106 A striking feature of this 
selection process, however, is the effusiveness of the boundaries between (hard or soft) norms 
and the facts which constitute a social reality. The distinction between actual facts, allegedly 
standing for an objective materiality or a state of things, and norms and normativity, by which 
we refer to the idealistic and symbolic dimensions of the world, is always a constructed one: in 
pointing to a particular ‘fact’, selections and choices have been made, which ultimately rest on 
value judgments regarding the status being accorded to the ‘facts’ in question.107 
 
In light of these observations, we now need to further flesh out the proposal in the previous 
section; the suggestion just made pertained to the development a richer concept of ‘context’ in 
order to gain a more adequate understanding of the complex qualities and dimensions of the facts 
that have given rise to cases such as the transnational human rights litigation in the Bridgestone 
or Firestone cases. Taking up the just made distinction between political economy and a 
normative dimension, we now need to ask about the nature of the relationship between both. The 
here made contention is that the former takes up the challenge of critically investigating the 
origin, the nature and selectivity of the ‘facts’ being considered in establishing the factual basis 
of a case, while the latter refers to the idealization and utopia of fact selection and establishment. 
The task becomes one of going beyond a narrow reading of the facts, one that is driven by 
incomplete testimony and typification, while avoiding to be lured down an alluring path that 
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promises to lead us to what can only be an outrageously unbounded ‘history of everything’. In 
other words, we need to identify the moment when and the ways in which lawyers, litigants and 
judges lose sight of the relevant facts and instead consolidate a manageable, i.e. justiciable 
factual basis, which from that point on serves as a complete snapshot of the ‘facts of the case’. It 
is here where lawyers will increasingly benefit from the advances made in anthropological and 
ethnographic methodological research, given that these areas currently display a forceful 
commitment to revisit and to scrutinize long established research routines and to update 
methodologies to new circumstances.108 A particular challenge for lawyers arises from the way 
in which they are now being pressured into acknowledging and processing numerous research 
that questions law’s epistemological basis, but to so without the proper awareness  of the 
historical traits of this inquiry into the factual basis of legal notions. In other words, lawyers 
today are thrown into a legal sociological discourse that has greatly advanced form its early 
beginnings and is today no longer merely concerned with the sort of “gap critique” (between law 
on the books and law in action), as it formed the centre of early 20th century legal sociological 
analysis.109 While much of early legal sociology aimed at showing how judges were prone to 
ignore both the (socio-economic as well as cultural) basis of legal norms and the effects of legal-
regulatory intervention110, the current reiterations of legal sociological analysis is distinctly more 
interdisciplinary and encompassing in nature. It is in that sense that we can speak of the 
challenge of legal sociology 2.0 for the majority of lawyers, who were trained in either the 
Ehrlichian spirit of recognizing the undeniable parallels between official and in-official 
regulatory regimes or the Dworkinian mindset with an all-else dismissing focus on legal 
adjudication as key to unlock law’s mystery.111 Moving beyond early legal sociologists’ 
analytical interest in the politics of legal formalism and the rising importance of expert 
knowledge and scientific governance112, intermediate legal sociologists between the 1960s and 
1980s decisively pushed for an interdisciplinary re-orientation of socio-legal studies.113 A similar 
differentiation of a primarily social-justice focused legal critique into an ever expanding series of 
critical engagements with developments in race, gender, environment, science or international 
affairs was witnessed among schools of thought with a significant progressive and legal 
reformist orientation such as the Critical Legal Studies movement.114 In comparison, current 
legal sociology, if it even still exists in the form of designated law school positions or curricular 
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components115, is prone to form alliances with an increasingly far-ranging array of intersections 
between law and social, media, behavioral, environmental, indigenous, religious, or cultural 
studies. While it is impossible to fully capture the potential consequences of this development116, 
it is obvious how the convergence of social science fields that gave rise to hybrid and ‘cross-
over’ academic realms such as “cultural” or “media” studies can ultimately leave a discipline 
such as law untouched. 
 
From this perspective, it appears as if a richer account of the relevant facts in a case will above 
all depend on a more contextual identification and reading of the data that can be accounted for 
as being of an explanatory nature for the case at hand. While the bulk of this work still needs to 
be done in terms of showing how legal sociology 2.0 must now consist of lawyers’ serious 
engagement with the advances in ethnographic research methodology117, with the critique of 
facts and truth in ‘science & technology studies’118 and with critical historiography as it has 
become pertinent in selected areas of law.119  
 
At the same time, while a more comprehensive approach to an analysis of the facts in a concrete 
case promises to assist in getting a clearer picture of the actual situation that characterized the 
conflict between the litigating parties, there will likely always remain a significant gap between a 
richer factual account of the actual interests and conditions present and the deeper structural 
frameworks of which a particular conflict scenario is part of. It is here, where for example 
scholars involved in the so-called Third World Approaches to International Law [TWAIL] have 
been able to unveil powerful connections between current governance conflicts and historical 
pathways, political choices and particular historical, socio-economic as well as geo-political 
circumstances.120 Another important development that promises to shed more light on the 
historically grown dimensions of the context in which many of the currently litigated human 
rights cases involving multinationals’ operations in third world countries are unfolding, is the 
convergence of ‘law & development’ and ‘transitional justice’.  
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VI. CONVERGING FIELDS, INTERSECTING EPISTEMOLOGIES 
 
Law and Development has always been an area which can neither be neatly and clearly defined 
nor boxed into clear-cut categories. The field has long been a battle field for opposing concepts 
of law, political and economic order and the role of institutional governance,121 and as such has 
always been a laboratory for audacious experiments with explosive material. Categories such as 
‘progress’, ‘development’ or ‘order’ are invariably contentious, and in the context of L&D are 
employed as bargaining chips in a high-stakes game over political and economic influence, 
autonomy and, emancipation.122 While specific local contexts of L&D became the loci of such 
contestation, often enough under the magnifying glass of international and national development 
agendas, market integration and state reform, one of the most striking discoveries to be made 
here relates to the fact that the contentious items in the L&D context are also those which have 
long informed a critical analysis of law and governance in the context of the nation state.123 As 
such, the boundaries between the developing and the developed world, between those countries 
receiving and those exporting or providing legal (or economic) aid become porous, and a legal 
theory of L&D can fruitfully build on its older domestic sister. 
 
Among the important scholarly projects pursued by L&D scholars has been the discovery and 
analysis of the legal pluralist nature of the governance orders in the context of development.124 
With a growing awareness of the different, existing ordering structures ‘on the ground’ in the 
development context came the realisation that any legal order challenges the observer to 
acknowledge the parallels between and the co-existence of formal and informal, hard and soft 
law, of legal and non-legal norms.125 This realisation prompted L&D scholars to acknowledge 
but also to build on the idea that many of the challenges pertaining to a law/non-law distinction 
that had been identified as specific to the development context, were in fact detachable from any 
legal governance framework. Indeed, the inadequacy of existing legal governance thinking 
pointed to the need for a different theoretical — but also, doctrinal — attention.126 
 
It is this realisation that allows for a better appreciation of the questionable foundations of a legal 
‘order’, of the embeddedness of legal governance in a particular institutional setting (eg, the 
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‘state’) and at a particular moment in (geo-political) time.127 To the degree that the struggle over 
law ‘reform’ in the context of development is seen as not entirely removed from contestations of 
legal (political, economic) order in the domestic context, L&D emerges as a field, which is just 
as much concerned with the relationship of law to its (particular, local) social environment and 
context as that has been the case for any other legal theoretical or legal sociological inquiry.128 
But, accepting this perspective also implies accepting the loss of an outside observer’s 
standpoint. Precisely, by acknowledging the inseparability of critical legal analysis in the 
domestic and the ‘development’ context, we lose the comfort of being ‘outside’ of the sphere 
which we are purporting to study and to examine in a disinterested manner. 129 Instead, the 
demarcation of the L&D context from that of one’s home legal system and jurisdiction becomes 
questionable in itself, because the assertions of law’s precariousness in the development context 
apply to the domestic home context with equal force. On that basis, the distinction between 
governance challenges ‘there’ and ‘here’ appears artificial. Indeed, the distinction seems 
designed to insulate the domestic context from critique while depicting the development context 
as deficient and requiring ‘aid’ and assistance. The identification of a series of legal governance 
questions as arising from within the context of a ‘developing country’ inevitably leads to these 
questions having to be seen as already pertinent much ‘earlier’, namely already present and 
evident in the context of domestic legal critique. 
 
A striking feature of this contextualisation of L&D as part of a larger exercise in investigating 
law’s relationship to and role in society, is the way, in which the field opens itself up to an 
engagement and exchange with complementary discourses about regulatory places and spaces. 
Both legal scholars130 and sociologists131 have been scrutinising the conceptual and constituted 
nature of such regulatory spaces; spaces which escape a straight-forward depiction from a single 
discipline’s vantage point. Just as this critique has become pertinent with regard to the analysis 
of different, specialised regulatory arenas, ranging from labour 132  to corporate, 133  from 
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environmental 134 to criminal law, 135 altogether suggesting a methodological shift away from 
comparative and towards transnational law,136 L&D has become a very active laboratory for a 
renewed engagement with a critical and contextual analysis of law in a fast-changing and volatile 
environment. 
 
This aspect has been underlined, perhaps most tellingly, by the recent approximation of L&D 
with the field of ‘transitional justice’ [TJ], which testifies to an increasing awareness among 
interested experts of the close connections between investigations into the ‘legacies’ of past 
injustices with programs of future-directed legal and economic aid.137 Closely connected to and 
oftentimes overlapping with this very vivid scholarly engagement has, of course, been an equally 
vibrant ‘literary’ 138  and cultural engagement with ‘transition’ periods. After the seminal 
(inevitably colonial) portrayals by Joseph Conrad in ‘An Outpost of Progress’ (1897) or ‘Heart 
of Darkness’ (1899), ‘post-colonial’ novels such as Chinua Achebe’s ‘Things Fall Apart’ (1958) 
or JM Coetzee’s ‘Waiting for the Barbarians’ (1980) again poignantly scrutinised the slippery 
slope between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that inescapably pervades any ‘intervention’ or ‘development’ 
context. How in the context of public international law’s attempts to address transnational 
military and civil conflict, this slope has become painfully obvious again, was powerfully 
illustrated in Anne Orford’s critique of the hidden, hegemonic aspirations of recent instances of 
‘humanitarian intervention’.139 Excavating the challenges of concepts such as ‘change’, ‘reform’ 
and ‘progress’, as they have been central to seminal transitional justice debates as those 
concerning South Africa140 or Sri Lanka,141 Achmat Dangor’s ‘Bitter Fruit’ (2001) or films such 
as Vithanage’s ‘Death on a Full Moon Day’, have become inseparably intertwined with the 
scholarly, ‘expert’ discourse around these instances of transitional justice. 
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But, what can this intersection of scholarly, literary, and cultural engagement tell us about the 
methodological challenges arising in the L&D (and, transitional justice) context? To the degree 
that we can already build on a host of critical work to scrutinise the orientation, method, and 
contentions of L&D and TJ theory, an additional aspect of this enterprise concerns the 
acknowledgement of and engagement with non-scholarly content. Another question concerns the 
demarcation of places and spaces in this context. What, we may ask, distinguishes the focus of 
Achmat Dangor’s poignant analysis of family relations in post-Apartheid South Africa142 from 
the haunting account of Mourid Barghouti’s return to Palestine after an involuntary 30-year 
exile?143 Emerging, from these accounts, is a powerful illustration of what we might call the 
‘transnational human condition’, marked by multilayered and multi-tiered relations of belonging 
and ‘citizenship’. It is this dimension of the ‘human condition’ that could arguably be seen as the 
fourth dimension of Hannah Arendt’s depiction of labour-work-action, 144  scrutinising the 
possibilities of political, social belonging in a post-national environment, which is marked by the 
fragility of political communities and, again, an increased precariousness of political voice.145 
 
Chinua Achebe, the author of the seminal novel ‘Things Fall Apart’ (1958), recounts in his 2009 
collection of short stories, ‘The Education of a British-Protected Child’, numerous instances in 
which he and the audiences he speaks before, are confronted with the porosity of the lines that 
divide ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, the ‘here’ and the ‘there’. In Achebe’s rendering, these experiences 
illustrate the tensions in people’s lives when trying to make sense of their deeply felt attachments 
to places of origin, places of meaning, when — at the same time — they find themselves on an 
inchoate and often swirling trajectory, which takes them through different places, communities, 
spheres of interaction, places of engagement and confrontation — with others, who have come to 
these places through similar patterns of predictable unpredictability. Achebe’s stories recount 
numerous instances of frustration in the face of alienation, cliché and stereotype that seem to 
repeat themselves — over and over again. The author presents them in an uncompromisingly and 
tirelessly analytical manner, the various accounts underlining the importance of difference in that 
which seems to be the same, the varying conjectures of people’s meetings, confrontations and 
clashes of viewpoints and observations that cannot be so simply traced back, as emerges from 
story to story, to one particular stance, one easily demarcated political viewpoint or a 
comprehensively founded moral choice. Instead, Achebe highlights the numerous cross-roads in 
people’s perceptions and judgments, the complex overlapping of context and intent that shape 
the moment where one formulates and utters one’s view. He seems to say ‘Look again’, ‘Think 
again’ and ‘Look again’, and it is this back and forth wandering of our gaze, which may help to 
better grasp the challenges in contemporary L&D and TJ contexts. These contexts are intricately 
marked by the simultaneous existence of the ‘new’ and the ‘old’. And yet we are asked to reject 
this (overly neat) juxtaposition for the ways in which it imposes an evolutionary narrative of 
progress onto a sphere that needs to be studied through its complex relationship between local 
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and global consciousness. 146  Similarly, both L&D and TJ become mere instantiations of a 
renewed effort to reflect critically on the methodological basis of legal-political governance. 
 
As such, both L&D and TJ can be seen as efforts undertaken from within law as scholarly 
discipline and practical endeavour to illustrate how law is constantly prompted to adapt to its 
changing environment – both substantively and normatively. This adaptation of law occurs in 
often unmapped, unchartered and undomesticated ‘spaces’. As in Achebe’s accounts, these 
spaces are both geographical and intellectual, both real and constructed. And, as is highlighted 
by the scholarship in the areas of L&D and TJ, the critical engagement with these allegedly 
dividing lines between ‘real’ and ‘constructed’, between, say, field work, empirical data, news 
reports and statistics on the one hand and description, critique, deconstruction, and argument, on 
the other, are at the core of what these two ‘fields’ are really all about. To both emphasise and 
simultaneously question the categories by which we draw lines between ‘here’ and ‘there’, 
‘home’ and ‘abroad’, ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, becomes an existential question for law and for the 
lawyer employing its label and toolkit. Seen, studied, theorised and practiced in this critical way, 
L&D and TJ become instantiations of a much more comprehensive engagement with the 
‘concept of law’, with the categories by which in research and curriculum lines are drawn 
between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ laws and legal cultures. Thus, the scholarship of L&D and TJ 
of such ambitious calibre is likely perceived as a threat to the standards and routines of 
parochially focused scholarship as it still dominates law reviews and conferences and as it, in 
myriad ways, continues to influence and shape law school course design and the programming of 
legal education. The particular approach here taken to defend L&D and TJ as both critical 
engagements with and representations of contemporary law threatens the daily routine of law 
schools that profess to teach their fee-paying clients to ‘learn to think like a lawyer’: the here 
embraced approach critically challenges this entire routine and suggests that it could all be in fact 
very different if only we cared to reflect more on the connections between ‘here’ and ‘there’. In 
other words, are the legal conflicts we are concerned with domestically really so much different 
from the ones we identify in ‘foreign’ places? If that is true, then the question is how we can 
develop an adequate epistemological framework for law in a transnational context. As is clear 
from Achebe’s stories, to think about these connections is a tiresome business, one that must 
remain cautious, self-critical and never-satisfied, one that continues to draw on a wide spectrum 
of information, data, accounts — in other words, on a complex body of ‘knowledge’, on which 
one draws and to which one already and constantly contributes. 
VII. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE IN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The vibrant and increasingly intersecting intellectual discourses around the conceptual and 
normative foundations of L&D 147  and of TJ 148  are increasingly complemented and 
contextualised by a critical engagement with the North’s 149  legal regulatory as well as 
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epistemological interventions in the ‘South’.150 Arising from this attention to L&D and TJ is an 
intensified interest in the nature of knowledge implicated in these different engagements. 
Knowledge becomes a crucial variable as it applies to a host of divergent conceptual and 
normative programs. For example, knowledge is at the heart of the expertise and ‘know-how’ 
retained by a governing body or drawn upon by governmental actors when crafting regulatory 
instruments and interventions.151 At the same time, knowledge as a variable and an unknown 
enters both sides of regulatory interventions — pertaining to what the regulator knows and what 
is known within the sphere acted upon. This double contingency of what law should know but 
can never know for certain, has long been a concern of legal regulatory theory, and of legal 
sociology and criminology in particular. 152  Given the complex interplay of domestic and 
transnational governance discourses and the centrality of knowledge in both,153 the intensified 
interest in scrutinising what we know when unleashing programs of aid, reform as well as 
‘technical’ and legal assistance has to be central to any future engagement with L&D and TJ as 
part of a larger, interdisciplinary theory of global governance.154 From the vantage point of a 
critical engagement with knowledge, such an enterprise must develop a methodology able to 
open up, rather than eclipse avenues of contestation and mutual learning.155 We can already see, 
how the parallels and shared interests in contemporary L&D and TJ discourses are echoed by the 
connections between domestic and transnational governance discourses. Where we find that 
L&D discourses are inseparably intertwined with TJ-related questions regarding the appropriate 
and non-universalising,156 legal/non-legal response to legacies of suppression, exploitation and 
domination, we are confronted with the co-evolutionary dynamics of legal/non-legal, hard/soft, 
formal/informal. In short, attending to knowledge points us to the legal pluralist of modes of 
governance characteristic in settings which we have hitherto tended to study through 
conventional notions of jurisdiction, that is, through legal spatial lenses.157 However, these co-
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evolutionary dynamics between L&D and TJ support the emergence of regulatory regimes which 
can no longer adequately be captured through categories of state sovereignty or jurisdiction. 
Instead, the emerging transnational regulatory landscape follows to a large degree the 
fragmenting dynamics of a functionally differentiated world society, prompting, in turn, an 
intensified investigation as to the legitimacy, that is, the normative and political implications of 
the systems theory’s world society model.158 
 
These debates provide a formidable background to the continuously evolving debate around 
L&D in that they complement and expand the highly charged economic and political stakes in 
this arena. ‘Knowledge’ occupies a crucial place in L&D scholars’ longstanding, persistent 
engagements with bridging both national and development governance discourses.159 Taking a 
closer look at the role of knowledge in the L&D context promises important insights into the 
future trajectory of this field in the above-sketched context of interdisciplinary global governance 
studies. What drives and motivates developments such as the World Bank’s self-description as a 
‘Knowledge Bank’160 becomes a matter of critical concern, and prompts our reflection on the 
origins as well as the experiences that have already been made with such data-driven governance 
approaches in other places and times. In other words, the question regarding the role of 
knowledge in today’s development agendas — in theory and practice — invites us to take a 
closer look at the connections and differences between the prominence of knowledge in this 
context and in domestic contexts in the past. To do so seems especially opportune in light of the 
crudeness of assertions, distinctions and categories that continue to characterise global 
governance discourses; particularly in terms of the descriptions and analysis of constellations 
that really deserve a more comprehensive and sophisticated conceptual treatment.161 Indeed, the 
persistence of inadequate analytic categories in the field of global governance is at considerable 
odds with contemporary analysis of knowledge-driven governance.162 Knowledge as an analytic 
category offers us a way forward. 
 
The overriding challenge arising from a critique of knowledge in the development context, 
however, consists in the question of frame of reference. Every employed conceptual, analytical 
and doctrinal toolkit itself has a history of its own, the way it came to be put together, the order 
of instruments that are stored and arranged on its inside, and the use that has been made of them 
over time. The L&D context in particular prompts a host of questions regarding the origin, 
adequacy and transferability of regulatory models. Similar to the seemingly never-ending self-
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inspection and critique of comparative law,163 L&D is a field forever belaboured and challenged 
on a complex methodological basis, which underscores the relevance of approaching a study of a 
local regulatory culture from a more comprehensive perspective, eventually allowing for a 
scrutiny of the actors, norms and processes, which shape the development context.164 But, how 
are we to account for inevitable baggage and background assumptions, that accompany and 
shape the governance as well as desired policy ideas transplanted from one context — which in 
the 20th century L&D context has been the post-Industrialist and post-Welfare constitutional 
state165 — into another context with institutional and normative dimensions which we might not 
be able to map with the cartography we are used to. This seems to be of particular importance 
with regard to the implicit assumptions informing an endorsement of regulatory models such as 
decentralisation, innovation and regulatory competition. In political and regulatory theory 
discourses of the last two to three decades, these terms emerged in an intricate intellectual space 
between economic and political theories and have by now attained an almost sacrosanct 
character, be that with regard to federal structures in complex polities166 or in the context of 
searching for growth models in path-dependent economies. 167  However, as examples of 
transatlantic transplants already illustrate, the effects of policies that endorse a fine-tuned 
subsidiarity-federalist framework and that place hope into the regulated self-regulatory dynamics 
of actors on different levels168 greatly depend on the historically and politically evolved context 
in which they are implemented. What might be in itself a very promising conceptual approach to 
the study of multi-level and multi-polar regulatory systems — and the EU certainly represents 
just that169 — will eventually unfold through highly intricate and unpredictable dynamics in a 
continuously evolving complex environment.170 
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To be sure, it is a no more than trivial insight that these experiences suggest the need to pay close 
regard to the locally existing rules and regulatory practices — the challenge consists in 
determining the form and process of ‘context sensitive’ regulation. It is with this challenge in 
mind, that we are finding ourselves torn between opening our toolbox of well-worn and tested 
tools and concepts on the one hand and starting ‘fresh’, with open eyes and without prejudice on 
the other.171 What is remarkable in this context is the impossibility of ‘breaking free’ even from 
the semantic and symbolic stronghold of certain categories, regardless of the degree to which 
these have been subjected to critique, deconstruction and demystification. This is as true today172 
as it was in the 1970s:173 in our search for appropriate regulatory approaches to be taken with 
regard to development contexts (as well as other, similarly complex regulatory spaces174), we 
strive to critically reflect on the usability of the rule of law, learned lessons with regard to 
democratic accountability, public deliberation or the separation of powers. Meanwhile, we 
realize how none of these principles can be lifted out of its context without losing some 
explanatory capacity, leading us back to the motivation of why we intended to draw on a 
particular regulatory experience in the first place. Again and again, we are confronted with the 
particularity of an evolutionary process in a specific space that seemingly frustrates all attempts 
at translation or transplantation.175 And yet, precisely because of this confrontation, we return, 
again and again, to a critical reflection on the categories through which we seek both to explain 
and to shape spaces of vulnerability and precariousness. There appears to be a crucial difference, 
however, between an earlier, progressive, critical exercise of such reflection and the more 
inchoate, interdisciplinary approach that seems to be forming today out of a combination of 
legal, political, sociological, economic and anthropological theory on the one hand and historical 
and linguistic study on the other.176 While this difference is still hard to pinpoint or to make 
fruitful, it becomes ever more evident that in close proximity to the continuing stand-offs 
between conservative and progressive struggles over development policies, the range of theory, 
vocabulary and categories, frameworks and imaginations is expanding. In that context, the 
astutely recorded accounts by Achebe of his interactions with ‘third world experts’,177 the 
extermination of interview protocols and legislative materials of law-making processes in 
Singapore’s ‘authoritarian’ Rule of Law178 or the anthropological scrutiny of the World Bank’s 
human rights programs179 — they are all and each one of them crucial elements that help draw a 
richer and more sophisticated picture of the development context today. In other words, we see a 
significant analytical expansion and deepening of our ‘knowledge’ basis vis-à-vis the 
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developmental state and the transnational ‘aid and development’ apparatus that is staring at it. 
The challenge remains in understanding and drawing the adequate lessons of such an expanding 
epistemic framework. 
 
VIII. EN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: THE SURPRISE THAT IS NOT – ALL LAW IS TRANSNATIONAL 
 
In an effort to connect the preceding sections on the status of knowledge in hybrid legal fields 
such as L&D and TJ with the opening parts of this essay on law’s general relationship to 
globalization, let us briefly address the idea that a project such as Transnational Law can 
function as a “theoretical conceptualization of law after the breakdown of methodological 
nationalism.”180 The contention here would be that such a characterization bears considerable 
promise. It is in that spirit that I suggest to re-open the discussion of concepts or proposals such 
as TL or LP, rather than dismissing them prematurely, and perhaps under the impression that 
their ‘deliverables’ are not yet as clearly defined as one would hope. My contention is that TL 
and LP are mutually intertwined precisely because both struggle with the ‘how’ of distinguishing 
between legal and non-legal rules. The answer cannot be a jurisprudential one alone. Instead, 
what appears to follow from discussions of TL and LP is, foremost, a growing awareness of the 
epistemological as well as normative fragility of any attempt at boundary drawing between 
different norm universes in the sense evoked by Cover.181 This fragility has become a central 
concern in the context of debates around the ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ of global governance. In the 
remainder, I want to argue that proposals such as TL or LP should be seen as necessary steps in 
the development of theoretical approaches to a legal theory (or, legal theories182) of global 
governance [GG]. GG appears to operate in current debates as an umbrella term that is employed 
to capture the still open-ended and non-linear183 transformation of a nation state-based model of 
political rule.184 One way to address these changes with uncertain outcome has been through 
ambitious assessments of the nature and status of law and its tight linkages with Western notions 
of (different notions, stages and representations of) the state.185 One reason why TL appears to 
have gained temporary currency might relatively easily be found in the fact that it operates as a 
manageable label to depict, as suggested already by Jessup186, both overlaps of and blind spots 
between categorically distinguished fields (in that case public and private international law). 
Another reason can be identified to lie in TL’s interdisciplinary nature, in that it is often times 
referenced from a variety of theoretical and disciplinary backgrounds precisely to capture a 
multitude of assertions relating to the transformation of jurisdictional (geopolitical, geographical) 
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boundaries,187 shifts in norm-making competence between nationally based and spatially 
operating actors,188 as well as the nature of ‘communities’, polities, and peoples.189 A similarly 
positive assessment seems to be in order with regard to LP, given that legal pluralists’ concern 
with the demarcation and politics of as well as with the tension between official and in-official 
bodies of norms, rules, recommendations, guidelines and standards does not – arguably – result 
in placing ‘everything’190 on the same level, but seeks to expose, again and again, the often 
questionable and contestable basis on which the distinction between law and non-law is drawn in 
the first place.191  
 
While the apparent frustration among many legal scholars today with the slippery nature of 
concepts such as TL or LP is understandable, the task of making sense of this multidisciplinary 
and multi-vocal engagement with globalization will eventually get easier as we all move through 
such stages of trial and error, exploitation, application and engagements with theory. Revisiting 
established legal fields, mostly thought of in their domestic, nation-state context but now 
reflected upon against the background of a globalization of law, we can see that the above 
described dilemma is in fact inherent to every area of law, long before we began inventing new 
names and setting novel boundaries. Examples of labor, corporate or constitutional law illustrate 
legal fields as epistemological and normative laboratories, through the study of which we can 
shed more light on the way in which law can only be understood against the background of 
society. And as such legal theory is inevitably caught up in the multi- and interdisciplinary 
efforts to adequately depict the contours and nature of today’s world society.  
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